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Well, the journey from Paris to Jerusalem continues as The Church and 
Postmodern Culture series has recently added Who’s Afraid of  Relativism?, Fieldwork in 
Theology, and From Nature to Creation. The series, now with ten books, was conceived 
to take postmodern philosophy and apply it to the life of  the church. It was offered 
as “French lessons for the church” (from the series introduction). So, the driving 
question for the overall series at this point is both simple and fair: Has the church 
learned French (postmodern philosophy)? Of  course, one does not just learn a 
language simply to say one has learned a language. The true measure of  learning 
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a language is whether or not one may converse thoughtfully in different places, 
whether one’s travel is eased and enriched by proficiency in a new language. So, 
have readers been able to learn French and then make the journey from Paris to 
Jerusalem (or from Binghamton, New York to Brockville, Ontario—my two cities 
of  ministry since the series appeared)? Have readers been able to speak French—
even in local clubs? Or, to put it another way, is there something different in the 
church on Sunday and through the church Monday to Saturday as a result of  the 
series? It would be unfair to tackle these questions before exploring the most recent 
contributions, so let’s examine them in turn.
Who’s Afraid of  Relativism?
Christians should be relativists. That is the ambitious thesis of  James 
K.A. Smith’s essay, Who’s Afraid of  Relativism?. The work, necessarily limited to 
maintain a certain amount of  readability, aims to offer a more robust version of  
relativism that stands up under the attacks of  those who would declare the concept 
a nonstarter in Christian thought. As such it is more descriptive than thorough. 
While Smith anticipates certain critiques, he does not always answer them as fully as 
the unconvinced reader might require.
Smith initiated the series by examining the “unholy trinity” of  Derrida, 
Lyotard, and Foucault (11), and he continues it by accessing and unpacking a 
new trio: Wittgenstein, Rorty, and Brandom. Smith examines relativism from 
the perspective of  pragmatism. Pragmatism is a philosophy of  contingency and 
community. Our selves, and hence our knowledge, depends. Smith argues that this 
kind of  relativism is in line with the Christian doctrine of  creation. Human beings 
are creatures and this impacts our accounts of  knowledge and truth (36). Smith 
unpacks Wittgenstein, Rorty, and Brandom in successive chapters before offering 
these insights for theological work in a postliberal age. 
The essay is a rejection of  the correspondence theory of  knowledge 
and the representationalist account of  language, where words refer to things. 
Wittgenstein, of  course, notes that language is more than reference; that language 
does things and that what language does is beholden to the community in which it 
is used. Words do more than refer. They are part of  a way of  life and can only be 
understood in these contextual language-games. Words are used well because users 
know how to use them, even if  the user does not know all the rules of  the game. 
This is the undoing of  (one sort of) realist world because the reference model 
is undone in that the “connection between words and the world is contingent” 
(52). Instead, language has meaning by virtue of  the agreement between users of  
the language. The possibility of  this agreement precedes meaning—“the web of  
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meaning” we inherit “is the product of  social construction” (53). Smith does not 
believe this falls into nihilism—where there is no meaning, but instead affirms 
that there are rules to the language game that can be articulated and that must be 
followed and that meaning is tied to the language game and never escapes a context.
Smith believes that language games ought not to be foreign to Christian 
thinking connecting the concept with Augustine’s distinctions between things/
signs and between use/enjoyment. Because things and signs can overlap in the 
same subject, communities determine when things are things, when they are signs; 
communities also teach what is to be used and what is to be enjoyed. The proper 
understanding and use of  the concepts is tied to a language game. Here Smith’s 
argument runs into trouble. Smith writes, “The use/enjoyment distinction is not 
‘objective’ in the sense that it can be just ‘read off ’ the world before us. The very 
distinction between use and enjoyment…is relative to a story, the story revealed in the 
Scripture proclaimed in the gospel, and handed down to us in the body of  Christ” 
(71). It seems that this distinction is relative to this theological story in that other 
stories might disagree about what is to be used and what is to be enjoyed. It could 
even be observed that the categories ‘use’ and ‘enjoy,’ not just what goes into these 
buckets but the categories themselves, are arbitrary to this theological story. Thus 
far, there seems little to challenge. Yet Smith’s conclusion is a little more interesting: 
“Even when we take the distinction [between use/enjoyment] to be true, receiving 
this as the ‘true story of  the whole world,’ we are always already dependent upon 
this social context of  reception and proclamation, this community of  practice that 
teaches us how to mean the world as a gift” (71-72, italics in original). Of  course 
one claims truth from a point of  view. Yet if  the word true is to have any sense, 
it must not be limited to the story itself. The claim to truth is not that one has no 
point of  view, but that one’s point of  view enables them to see accurately—better 
than others. The story, the point of  view, either helps its inhabitant/observer to 
see the world rightly or it doesn’t. The world is seen from a point of  view but 
the world is not limited to the perspective taken. When Smith says that the story 
reveals it does not necessarily mean that what is revealed is relative to the story. 
That a story/linguistic community is the means of  relation (communication) does 
not mean that what is related/communicated is only true relative to the community. 
Communities can see outside themselves; they simply cannot see from outside 
themselves. The means of  communication does not necessarily change the nature 
of  what is communicated. Yet, this seems to be the big conclusion drawn from 
Smith’s engagement with Wittgenstein. 
The implications of  this conclusion are then teased out as Smith 
considers Rorty. Most scrutinized is Rorty’s claim that “truth is what your peers will 
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let you get away with saying” (73). Rorty’s point is to break us from the Cartesian 
paradigm of  inside/outside, where the desire is to match what is inside the brain 
(thought) to what is outside the brain (object). While Locke followed Descartes, 
obsessing with how the mind actually makes this connection, Kant does away with 
the inside/outside paradigm saying that everything is in the mind. The mind is what 
makes the object what it is—the mind constitutes the object. Against this paradigm, 
Rorty says that knowledge is cultural rather than individual. It is more about the give 
and take of  a culture’s conversation that the individual’s “confrontation” with the 
outside world. Rorty does not believe this means there is no “ontological weight” to 
things. Rejecting the correspondence theory of  truth is not to reject that things are 
independent of  theories (87). But isn’t this just what is at stake—that some things 
are real and true regardless of  their being contextualized? Truth is the category 
appropriate to a culture’s story inasmuch as the story lines up (corresponds?) with 
what is real. Its truth is relative not to the story itself, but to reality being related by 
the story. 
Smith might object that there is no foundation outside the game created 
by the community telling its story, in which case it seems to me that the notion of  
truth is lost as a possible adjudicator between the stories of  two or more cultures. 
Smith objects to the notion of  adjudication, presumably, because it might rely on 
a universal language or foundation. There is worry that making a decision between 
truth claims might pretend the adjudicator occupies a space outside the world. After 
all, one cannot escape the “community of  practice that is the locus of  meaning 
[because it] is always already embedded in the world” (94). Objective truth is 
critiqued because it seems to remove the knower from reality. To be embedded in 
the world means that our encounter with truth is not against it, but within it. 
Smith says that Rorty’s pragmatism embraces our creaturely dependence. 
Rorty’s belief  that valuations are relative to (dependent upon) communities and 
their social practices does not mean Rorty is a nihilist (98). Instead, Smith argues 
that such dependence is a mark of  being a creature: “Our dependence on the divine 
is inextricably bound up with our dependence on other human beings. This is why 
we are not merely dependent but also social” (99). Yet, is human interdependence 
really “inextricably bound up” with divine dependence? Can humans breathe life 
into other humans without first being sustained by the Creator? Is it not true that the 
dependence of  the entire creation on the Creator is a categorically different kind of  
dependence than its internal interdependence? Does the Creator’s communication 
to a community through a story not have subsequent implications for the nature of  
knowledge—found within that story, of  course, but with implications for all other 
narratives and communities of  practices?
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One gets the impression that there is room for proper evaluation 
between narratives when Smith says that Rorty not a skeptic. “There are good and 
bad construals, better and worse accounts. But ‘good’ and ‘better’ accounts are 
not so because they have managed to mirror reality and escape the contingent, 
social conditions of  knowing. No, good and better accounts are those that better 
enable us to cope with the obduracy of  things….” (100). What does it mean for an 
account to truly enable one to “cope with the obduracy of  things” except that it 
mirrors reality? A map helps to keep me from bumping into trees, poles, and ditches 
inasmuch as it keeps me on the road. 
Smith believes that that Christian faith becomes the revelation that breaks 
into the world that allows the believer to move and live well. Revelation does not 
pull us out of  the world, but comes to us, kenotically (110). “Everything we know 
and confess as Christians is relative to this (contingent, historical) revelation, and our 
reception of  this as revelation is dependent upon our inculcation in the community 
of  social practice that is the church. There is now no revelation outside the church 
because there is no meaning that is not ‘use’” (112, italics in original). Once again, 
is this really true? Adam, Noah, and Abraham all have divine encounters outside 
an established “discursive community of  practice.” Jesus encounters God’s voice 
without the community’s affirmation. Is there a community involved in that none 
of  these men are completely isolated (with the possible exception of  Adam)? Of  
course. Is there revelation outside the church? Indeed. Does the Holy Spirit bear 
witness outside the church with a person? Did the Lord Jesus encounter Saul 
within the church? These counterexamples are meant to show that a philosophy of  
pragmatism cannot be developed outside a theological context. If  one’s discursive 
community of  practice is the church, then revelation is the starting point rather 
than what subsequently needs to be shoehorned into a philosophy. It is theology 
that illumines the philosophy of  pragmatism, not vice versa. Everything is relative 
to the story of  God, to the claims of  theology as they are faithful to the revelation 
of  God. That, it seems to me, is what people mean when they claim something as 
absolute truth. 
Smith’s final two chapters look to take the re-orientation offered by 
Wittgenstein and Rorty and make them applicable through the philosophy of  
Robert Brandom in the context of  Christian doctrine. Smith wants to maintain a 
place for the truth of  doctrine without forsaking the pragmatism previously argued. 
So, Smith accesses Brandom’s categories of  implicit and explicit: Christian doctrine 
is making explicit (knowing that) of  the Christian faith what is implicit (the know 
how) in it. Smith points to the cultural-linguistic paradigm of  George Lindbeck as a 
test case. Since doctrine is cultural-linguistic, it means that there is no lone knower, 
Perry: Special Book Review Essay   189
no isolated individual capable of  “processing facts and claims against ‘reality’” 
(171). Clearly, Smith is in favor of  the Christian community and sees it as necessary.
Yet, Smith’s claims seem to soften toward the end: 
[P]ragmatism’s appreciation of  the contingent, communal 
conditions of  knowledge does not undercut the ability to 
make universal claims, nor does it preclude the possibility of  
asserting universal norms. It only means that it is impossible to 
see or grasp such norms from ‘nowhere’ or from an ‘absolute’ 
standpoint…. Instead of  undercutting the uniqueness of  
Christianity, then, this pragmatist account actually heightens 
it: to see and understand and grasp those ‘universal’ features 
of  God’s creation requires the unique capacities bequeathed 
to us by the community of  practice that is the body of  Christ. 
Christian revelation in not less important in this picture, but 
more. (173) 
So, communities can make universal truth claims. One wonders all the fuss, then. 
Consider the question: Which came first: The truth claim or the community? If  the 
community came first, then it seems there is a time when the truth claim was not 
universal, and, therefore, is not truly universal. If  the truth claim came first, then 
the entire pragmatist project is lost because things are not purely contingent and 
communities are not the source of  meaning. They are the context in which truth is 
discovered and revealed. One does not need to stand outside a community to make 
such a claim. One only needs to see that this binary logic is true to all communities. 
Fieldwork in Theology
Let’s move on to the next installment. Fieldwork in Theology by Christian 
Scharen is written with five big ideas that are related clearly in a way that forms 
the book’s progression: The world matters; research is self-reflective; bodies are 
our context for research; understanding comes through embodied practices; 
Christians can immerse bodily for research. Scharen begins with a passionate plea 
for the church and for individual Christians to “wake up” from the slumber of  
Christendom. “Suffering, healing, reconciling, and doing justice” call our best 
attention and participation with the Spirit (5); the same Spirit who makes our 
wakefulness possible and calls our obedience. Only when Christians are awake 
can we understand “the complexity of  this beautiful and broken world” (5). And 
what it will take to understand is fieldwork in theology: the “careful, disciplined craft 
[of] inquiry…[that] seeks both to claim knowledge of  divine action and to discern 
an appropriate human response” (5). What fieldwork in theology looks like is the 
subject of  the book.
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Fieldwork in theology begins with an emptying—a “dispossession,” to use 
Rowan Williams’ phrase—that takes its cues from the incarnation. To understand, 
the Christian must also live in the field—the social context of  an actual life—and 
develop a habitus—a set of  practices that form the mode of  being in the field. Both 
of  these are concepts from Bourdieu that can only be applied when there is a break 
from commonsense interpretation and a break within the researcher personally, so 
that the researcher and method of  research are being under investigation, as well. 
Scharen nicely performs this reflexive task with a cursive (by necessity, as the book is 
a tidy 114 pages) academic and biographic contextualization of  Pierre Bourdieu and 
short windows into Scharen’s own personality and method through examples of  
research projects and illustrations using contemporary music. This reflexive task is 
necessary because of  sin: we cannot be hubristic in our understanding, as though we 
have not been affected by sin. Instead, we must enter another’s story, much as God 
has done in the incarnation, and understand within the lived context of  the other.
Entering the context of  another is an embodied experience. “Our 
bodies…are our very means for relating to and living meaningfully in the world” (51). 
We understand as we encounter. Here Scharen has a nod to the phenomenology—
“a way to pause and notice how it is that one has a world” (53)—and illustrates with 
the game of  soccer. The soccer field is not an object for study, but the plane on 
which the game is played and the field that forms certain rules and actions. Consider 
the incarnation as methodological mandate: Jesus did not understand the human 
field by distant observation, but through entering the field. Yet, Jesus’ life is what 
makes our Christian research possible in that Jesus did not succumb to the wrong 
“rules” of  the game, but performed God’s love, God’s mercy, and God’s life without 
pause, which opens the possibility for our self-giving love—our wakefulness. “We 
have no other language for the unity of  God but this story of  risk lived in Jesus. 
We…cannot say what God is in God’s essence save what we can say by the narrative 
of  Jesus’s life, death, and resurrection” (84). Yet while our previous failures must 
cause humility, still the Spirit’s power enables humble action.
This sanctified immersion removes the privileged vantage point of  the 
observer but makes possible “practical mastery” of  the other’s practices (75). 
In this line of  thinking, the reader is given new reflections for the practice of  
repentance—a kind of  changing within one’s field and of  one’s improper habitus
that is Christocentric. There is no repentance with the turn to Christ; instead there 
is only bondage in one’s inherited context. Freedom outside the structure of  the 
field for the benefit of the field is strictly a theological possibility. Yet the reader 
is not permitted to become too abstract. No, life is always lived—and done so 
Christianly in the concrete practices of  the church. These concrete practices by 
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flesh and blood people are theologically revealing, exposing the actual beliefs of  a 
community, whether coherent or not. 
Finally, the urging of  Scharen is not just for the reader to learn about 
fieldwork in theology, but to become a theologian in fieldwork: Explore the world; 
immerse in the contexts being studied; develop a habitus in the world but without 
forgetting that all of  this began as a dispossession in light of  the incarnation and by 
the power of  the Spirit. As Bourdieu’s student Wacquant said of  the methodology 
he developed in light of  field and habitus: “Go ahead, go native, but come back a 
sociologist!” (100), so might Scharen say: “Go ahead, go native, but come back a 
Christian!” In fact, Scharen might say that the only way to go is not to go native, 
but to go as a Christian: learn within and as the body of  Christ. “Sometimes, in 
witnessing a life in the self-forgetting of  this exercise in understanding, ‘the most 
important thing is to silently wait.’ Here, in the holy moment of  deep silence, 
listening to another find words for the experience of  his or her life…the whole 
practice of  research is subsumed by our participation in listening as God does, the 
God who bends near to hear our cries” (114).
Scharen has exemplified the best of  the Church and Postmodern Culture 
series by expressing difficult thinkers in accessible and practical ways. The book 
exemplifies its own value by being remarkably self-aware. Scharen writes with crystal 
clarity, but refuses to write as though the concepts are obvious and reminds the 
reader that the concepts are not simple. The presentation is clear and compelling 
but the reader knows that undertaking fieldwork in theology will be a challenging 
task. 
Perhaps the challenge of  fieldwork in theology is illustrated by Scharen’s 
critique of  Hauerwas and Willimon’s Resident Aliens. Scharen reads Hauerwas and 
Willimon as developing a community whose home is elsewhere, which facilitates 
an identity and action plan that is “over against the world” (8). Scharen reads this 
mandate as developing a community aside from the communities of  the world, 
where Christian formation and discipleship themselves are witnesses to the world. 
Now, this read of  Hauerwas and Willimon is possible, though in the forms of  
life, which this theology developed in me, and my fellow seminarians where the 
book was required reading, I rarely encountered such a sectarian expression. I often 
experienced quite the opposite of  what Scharen feared. And I certainly did not 
encounter communities that sought a “disembodied home elsewhere” (13). Perhaps 
Hauerwas and Willimon are doing what Scharen advises in research methodology: 
they are taking sin seriously. For Scharen, sin-inspired skepticism suggests the 
researcher enter the other’s context and to remain self-reflexive in critique while 
performing analysis. For Hauerwas and Willimon, sin chastens the efforts of  the 
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believer that she or he may make the world more just. As Hauerwas says, “[The] 
first task of  the church is not to make the world more just but to make the world 
the world.”1 
From Nature to Creation
Living rightly in the world requires a rigorous theological vision. 
Christians have thought too narrowly about this kind of  life, perhaps defaulting 
to relational, political, economic, even psychological life. Norman Wirzba’s slender 
volume is a passionate call to expand the Christian vision to include the whole 
world. From Nature to Creation is not just a title, but the movement Wirzba seeks 
for readers to become people who can “nurture and heal and celebrate the gifts of  
God” (1). Put most clearly, Wirza says that “is a contradiction to profess belief  in 
God the Creator and then live in ways that degrade and destroy God’s creation” 
(25). If  the world is simply nature, then harmful activity follows; if  it is creation, then 
human beings are placed within it and have responsibilities to it. Wirzba unfolds the 
move from nature to creation, fleshing out the vision of  Christian creaturely living, 
through five big ideas.
First, to live rightly requires that we narrate and name the world rightly. 
Naming and narrating well involves proper understanding of  what something is 
and where it comes from (and where it is going). Matter is not amoral and so things 
cannot be categorized simply for economic value (or other subjective values). For 
example, animals are not meat machines; plants are not pharmaceutical resources; 
human beings are not (simply) consumers. This wrong naming is a result of  
deficient theology. Wirzba notes that on the heels of  Nietzsche’s death of  God 
there was the death of  everything else (6). Without a creator to guide the naming 
and narrating of  creation, human beings filled the void, becoming “creators of  
worlds of  their own imagining” (15) and subsequent (ab)users of  this world. It 
became more important to know and use the world than to love it, and so poisoned 
water, eroded soils, detonated mountains, cleared forests, melting glaciers, animal 
and plant extinction, and expendable laborers resulted (13). No longer servants and 
priests, but now engineers and technicians (16), human beings lost the vision that 
the world is “God’s love made visible, fragrant, tactile, audible, and delectable” (21). 
Yet Jesus re-narrates the world—including —the “who, where, and how of  human 
life” (24)—by recapitulation. He is the true human being and by his redemption 
of  creation, Christians may live in the world differently because Christians live in a 
different world. 
Second, the best understanding of  living wrongly in the world is through 
the lens of  idolatry. When the good gift of  creation is made into an idol, then it 
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ceases being creation and becomes nature. Wirzba traces two meanings of  nature, 
each with harmful consequences. “Nature” can be the internal principle or power or 
process “whereby a thing is what it is” or “by which it achieves its end” (33). It can 
also mean wildness—the world that exists without human interference (35). These 
options may leave people inattentive of  nature, abusive toward nature, or willing to 
dominate and manipulate its power for human gain. 
Wirzba grounds this errant approach to the world in nominalism—the 
belief  that a thing is what it is as a result of  the name given to it. This view primarily 
understands the creative act of  God as an act of  power, deemphasizing wisdom or 
purpose in the things God made (41). Since God hasn’t given a purpose, humans 
can make their own purpose for the world and its contents. Whereas the earlier 
vision of  humanity was to contemplate the world and to belong “harmoniously” 
within it, “ ‘subject to’ order and purposes beyond [the subject’s] own devising…
now the purpose of  life [is] to give expression to oneself in one’s actions in the world” 
(45). Wirzba challenges this shift of  modernity because it sets human beings over 
against nature. Rather than believing there is a valueless access to the world, waiting 
to be named by our values, Wirzba argues that humans should see themselves as 
part of  the objective world and because humans are part of  the world, humans 
must be careful of  the desire to know the world (52-53). Overemphasized and 
divorced from loving the world, the pretension to knowledge removes the world’s 
alterity. Rather than being part of  the world, humans make the world subject to their 
desires. In this inequality, with the world ordered to the subject’s desires, the world 
becomes unlovable.  
This phenomenon of  using but not loving the world shows the full 
duplicity of  idolatry. Wirzba leans on Jean-Luc Marion to describe idolatry, who 
argues that idols are not self-made, but made by idolaters. The idol does not 
cause the lusting gaze, but “the gaze makes the idol” (51). In the context of  the 
death of  God, nature becomes the source of  life, subject to the human’s desires: 
Simultaneously, nature is degraded and idolized by wrong perception. 
All is not lost, however, because, third, human beings can learn, through 
practice and transformation, to perceive the world as God’s creation and good gift.
“To know imaginatively is to try to see the world with the love by which God sees 
and sustains the world” (4). Yet how important is the word try? Can this vision be 
accomplished? As Wirzba asks, “Is a nonidolatrous form of  perception possible?” 
(69). Is it possible to live outside the utilitarian, frenzied, transient, disconnected 
form of  life that not only shapes how we perceive but also what technology and 
media allow us to perceive? To fix this errant, surface-level gaze, to sense and to 
see the love of  God in ever deeper ways (72), Wirzba suggests icons. Because divine 
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energy (as distinct from God’s essence) is found in all of  creation, icons allow the 
observer to practice seeing beneath the surface, to become enabled to see the beauty 
of  God’s creation as the love of  God made tactile. In this practice, human desire 
may be transformed and trained—purified and cleansed—to seek the wellbeing of  
the other (92).
Fourth, in this transformation, human beings are connected with the 
rest of  creation, becoming ever increasingly aware of  their dependence on the life 
and death of  other creatures to survive. This mutual interdependence of  creation 
requires love. Wirzba wants human beings not just to have “information about 
the world” but “capacities that will help us [to] love the world” (3). To develop 
these capacities requires a proper theological anthropology. Wirzba thus argues for 
a human being to be understood not primarily as a subject but as a creature. This 
anthropology not only reminds the human being of  her physicality and subsequent 
dependence on land and other creatures for life, but it also shapes the metaphysical 
framework of  a truly theological ecology: human beings are part of  the good 
creation of  God, interdependent on each other, and ultimately dependent on God. 
Wirzba utilizes the helpful description of  non-competitive transcendence. That is, 
the interdependence creatures have on each other is of  a different kind that the 
creation’s complete dependence on God. 
Finally, Wirzba argues that practicing creatureliness will lead human 
beings to maintain a posture of  thanksgiving. Contra Derrida, Wirzba not only 
believes that gifts are possible, but that gifts are necessary because they create and 
maintain relationships of  mutual thanksgiving marked by ceremony and beauty. 
Good gifts do not restrain freedom, create obligation, harm the other, or place 
the other in debt, but they do connect people (140-41; 150). Ironically to the 
postmodern ear, to seek the phenomenon of  a pure gift—a gift that does not create 
ongoing context—“ is to desire the death of  relationship, which is necessarily also 
the death of  life!” (149). Further, gifts undermine the role of  money, which creates 
a world of  simple exchange, where “one does not need to say sorry or thank you” 
(141). When we realize that all of  life is gift, we will live in a posture of  thanksgiving, 
holding carefully the gifts received and holding open-handedly the gifts that we pass 
on. Once again, such a life of  thanksgiving among creatures is not in competition 
with God. Instead, the life of  creaturely thanksgiving naturally flows to the praise 
of  God, the Creator (156).
Now that the work has been summarized, let us examine From Nature to 
Creation critically. Wirzba desires not only to help his readers name and narrate the 
world rightly, but, presumably, to do so himself. Thus, at places where the world 
is described incongruently with the world readily seen by this reader, at least, then 
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questions need to be raised. An example: Wirzba leans on Jeffrey Bishop’s “The 
Anticipatory Corpse: Medicine, Power, and the Care of  the Dying” in a description 
of  the narrow anthropology in today’s medicine and medical education, describing 
Bishop’s thought as follows: “[T]oday’s doctors are being trained to bracket and 
ignore the messiness of  the lives of  patients who eat, work, and live in families 
and communities because these ‘external factors’ unnecessarily complicate the 
neat analysis of  individual bodies described as physiological machines” (15). I have 
experienced the care of  a handful of  doctors through childhood, adolescence, and 
adulthood in various locations through two countries. This does not describe my 
experience. Does it accurately describe the world of  western medicine or a world or 
is it a caricature? 
Wirzba may also miss true narration of  the world. It has been said that 
in the Old Testament, land is so prominent that it is almost a character. Almost. 
At times the land seems a character itself  in From Nature to Creation. For example, 
Wirzba, quoting Wendell Berry, writes “[R]e-enter the woods. For only there can 
man encounter the silence and darkness of  his own absence. Only in this silence 
and darkness can he recover the sense of  the world’s longevity, of  its ability to 
thrive without him, of  his inferiority to it and his dependence on it…. That is, 
he must re-enter the silence and darkness and be born again” (106). This, simply, 
is not the vision of  Eden, where humanity is given the vision of  a world thriving 
because of  the order and structure provided by God, yet from where humanity is 
to bring order and form to the rest of  the world. The world does not thrive, in the 
Edenic vision, without humanity. Without humanity extending the work of  God 
throughout creation, the forest is chaotic, its silence and darkness is the absence 
of  humanity, but it is not a sign of  flourishing, but of  humanity’s failure to live the 
role of  God’s image on earth. What a thriving forest looks like, sadly, we can hardly 
imagine. Put another way, humans are not born again within the forest, but for the 
forest. The forest does not thrive without humanity; it thrives with proper humanity. 
This does not negate the value the forest may hold to show humanity a 
world marked by human absence. That world will not be marked by human failure 
and so may present a unique vision of  such a world. But neither will it be marked 
by human flourishing, which is the pinnacle of  the creation narrative with humans 
in God’s image.
Wirzba’s compelling vision, then, would be improved by accessing the 
priestly role given to Adam. Adam’s responsibility to cultivate and keep the creation 
(Gen. 2:15) can also be understood as “serving and guarding,” which are the priest’s 
roles (Num. 3:7-8; 8:25-26; 1 Chron. 23:32; Ezek. 44:14). 2 Wirzba’s own advocacy 
of  the practice of  gardening challenges the idea of  the forest producing true 
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humans. In the forest, in a sense, nothing thrives because there is no true mutual 
relationship, but only adaptation and survival. Creation longs for the revealing of  
God’s sons and daughters not only because without redemption, humans contribute 
to the world’s brokenness, but because through redemption humans are the means 
of  its flourishing.
These encouragements are offered to strengthen Wirzba’s presentation 
and extend, hopefully, his perception of  the world. Readers want to perceive the 
world more deeply, more truly because of  Wirzba’s work, and Wirzba offers simple 
practices that may help: eating, gardening, sharing. We eat with intention because 
“food is God’s love made delectable” (124). We garden because we can better 
perceive the dependence we have on land. We visit farms to see where food comes 
from (127). All of  this is meant to ground thanksgiving in the beautiful, ceremonial 
daily life of  God interacting with God and God’s creatures.
Conclusion
Let me finish with a few observations and subsequent recommendations. 
First, of  the 39 endorsements on the back covers, 34 are from individuals explicitly 
connected with a college, divinity or graduate school, university or seminary. There 
are no back cover endorsements from people explicitly connected with a church. 
This discrepancy is especially key when the series aims to be speaking to the 
church. That academics have endorsed the work is not inappropriate, but engaging 
intentionally with current or recent pastors would have been more appropriate. 
After all, if  the goal was to influence the church, why not seek the endorsement of  
the most influential churches? Endorsements from Brian McLaren (Who’s Afraid of  
Postmodernism?) and Marva Dawn (Liturgy as a Way of  Life) are examples of  people 
attempting to live at the intersection of  church and academy, but perhaps Rick 
Warren, Bill Hybels, or Andy Stanley would have served the purpose, as well; perhaps 
pastors who write a little more academically, like Tim Keller; perhaps people who 
have served closely with (or even in) the church like Brenda Psalter McNeil, Nancy 
Beach, Francis Chan, or Sally Morgenthaler. There is no need to belabor the point, 
which remains, simply, writing for the church requires interacting with people who 
lead and shape actual local churches. To influence the church will require the series 
to write with an audience in mind that listens to a different set of  endorsements.
A second observation: The series is made up entirely of  male authors. I 
offer this not as a critique, but simply as an observation. It is possible (even likely) 
that female authors were invited but have declined. It is also possible that female 
authors are slated for future contributions. However, the observation is necessary 
in a series that intends deconstruction as a category and practice for Christian thinking.
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So, with ten volumes, has the church learned French from the Church and 
Postmodern Culture series? Are churches different on Sunday? Are communities 
different through the church’s ministry Monday-Saturday? Perhaps. To use Smith’s 
phrase, it depends. To answer the question depends on what “learning French” really 
means. Does it mean to become fluent in the language of  Continental postmodern 
philosophy? Or does it mean to become fluent in categories impacting the church? 
If  the former, then no; if  the latter, then perhaps. The series has widened its focus 
as it has progressed—something that has been beneficial to the readers, but makes 
it difficult to evaluate the series on its initial commitment. Perhaps we could say that 
the series began to teach its readers French, but has taken liberties to stray from the 
language itself, pointing out how French is related to other languages along the way. 
When I was in high school, I looked forward to my favorite classes with 
anticipation. Often the best classes were the ones that provided some freedom for 
student led discussion and analysis. The best classes allowed students to think about 
and speak to the contemporary events in the context of  the lesson. Likewise, I look 
forward to every installment in this series, believing that each lesson will help me 
to address and consider current events from a different angle. Baker Academic and 
James K.A. Smith are to be commended for the series. I hope they keep teaching. 
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